Defending Rumsfeld

Whatever you think about outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is wrong. That, at least, is the contrarian conclusion I reached after scanning the press coverage for the past few days. As some were frantically keen for The New York Times to decide what their views would be on this matter, I reached to my bookshelf and pulled down Pentagon analyst Eliot Cohen's essay on democratic leaders in wartime, "Supreme Command." \nThis is the single most important document for those various pundits who assure themselves and others that Rumsfeld's legacy of firm civilian management of the military is over.\nAt its core is the question: Who should run the show in times of war -- political or military leaders? This tension runs through American history, and Cohen settles it very much in the favor of the politicians. \nRumsfeld often seemed the bridge between military and civil relations. In the course of playing this role, he attracted an array of ill-informed critics from at least three diverse camps: antiwar Democrats who have been calling breezily for his resignation ever since he was offered it, only to be rebuffed by the president at whose pleasure he continued to serve; the military brass who largely despised his program of transformational warfare based on the assumption that modernization trumped manpower; and even (a few!) stern defenders of the Iraq war who ignored his many and varied accomplishments.\nMr. Rumsfeld built an accomplished record in his post as defense secretary. It's well-known that the United States is responsible for 48 percent of the planet's military spending. What is less recognized is that the Pentagon is responsible for nearly 80 percent of military research and development spending among the generally wealthy governments comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which means that America's supremacy in military affairs grows every day. This was Rumsfeld's buildup, done in the midst of furnishing a workable war strategy after Sept. 11, 2001, allowing for such impressive regime change operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.\nBut while necessary, it was not sufficient. Despite my abhorrence for carping critics, it's nonetheless true that he conceived no way of salvaging a failing Iraq policy. War is a performance business, and in Iraq -- where the Army is too thinly stretched -- Rumsfeld hasn't performed his best.\nPart of the problem, of course, is that U.S. defense spending remains at modest levels, especially for a time of war. We have less to spend on guns because we're spending so much more than ever before on butter -- especially entitlements such as health care and pensions. A few weeks ago I wrote of the political history and moral legitimacy of the American Empire. Now, all evidence suggests we need an imperial army. \nPatriot though he is, Rumsfeld too often failed to grasp the need to consider, but also to inform, correct and even overrule counsel from the military brass. One hopes that his successor, Mr. Gates, will advise the president to fine-tune that long-standing imbalance. After all, wars are too important to be left to the generals.